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Abstract
There is a debate over the reliability of the Chinese data (e.g., Young, 2003; Holz,
2003, 2006). In this paper we test the Chinese provincial panel data for the period
1978-2002 against the predictions from the technology di¤usion model. We nd that
the estimated coe¢ cient on initial real GDP per worker is negative and signicant,
showing strong evidence of conditional convergence; the estimated coe¢ cients on
secondary school human capital investment rate and labor force growth are positive
and negative respectively, signicant at the 5% level, in both LSDV (Least squares
dummy variables) estimation and system GMM (Generalized method of moments)
estimation that overcomes the endogeneity of these variables. The test accepts that
the estimate coe¢ cients on physical capital and human capital investment rates
are equal, with absolute magnitudes about half of that on labor force growth in
LSDV estimation. The estimated coe¢ cient on the FDI to GDP ratio that captures
technology di¤usion is insignicant in LSDV estimation but becomes signicant in
system GMM estimation. All these are consistent with the technology di¤usion
model (and the augmented Solow model). Therefore, the reform period Chinese
provincial panel data may be reliable for growth regressions.
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1 Introduction
The Peoples Republic of China (hereafter China) has achieved impressive growth in the
past three decades. The Chinese experience may help to solve many theoretical debates
and o¤er useful lessons for other countries. Unfortunately, there is a debate over the
reliability of the Chinese data. Some authors emphasize the statistical discrepancies of
the Chinese data (see e.g., Hsueh and Li, 1999; Young, 2003), while others argue that the
Chinese data are reliable and the criticism is due to misunderstanding (see e.g., Chow,
1993; Holz, 2003, 2006).1 Some authors have used the Chinese macro data to test theories
(see e.g., Zhang and Zou, 1998; Démurger, 2001; Narayan et al., 2008). Therefore, it is
appealing to investigate whether the controversial Chinese macro data are reliable for
researches on its growth and business uctuations. In this paper we take an indirect
approach by testing the Chinese macro panel data against the augmented Solow model
and a technological di¤usion model to see whether they are reliable for growth regressions.
Why does such an indirect approach using growth regressions in the line of Barro
(1991) and Mankiw et al. (1992) seem meaningful? There is already a large literature
that estimates the production function for China (see e.g., Chow and Li, 2002; Li, 2003).
But as Li (2003) summarizes, this approach cannot deal with the potential endogeneity of
the explanatory variables. Moreover, it cannot isolate the contributions of human capital
and technological change to output growth. Our approach complements and improves
over this approach in the following sense. First, it is similar to production function
estimation with a particular production function form, namely the augmented Solow
model. Although this is a strong assumption, it is widely used in the empirical growth
literature (e.g., Mankiw et al.). In so doing, we can produce results on the determinants of
Chinese economic growth that are comparable to the existing large literature on empirical
growth pioneered by Barro and Mankiw et al.. If it turns out the Chinese provincial panel
data perform well in such framework, the potential benet is substantial. As mentioned,
China has achieved impressive growth after its reform and opening-up in 1978. The
Chinese experience should provide useful lessons for other developing and transitional
economies. Moreover, it may provide a natural experiment that may help to solve many
theoretical and empirical debates. One example would be whether Chinese reform merely
follows growth (i.e., growth causes reform) or it has a causal e¤ect on growth (i.e., reform
causes growth). The reform could be any kind of reform such as nancial reform, scal
decentralization, trade liberalization, and even political decentralization. Each of these
topics has a large literature that is full of hot debate. The growth regressions following
Barro and Mankiw et al. may help more to solve these debates as explained below.
Second, our approach can avoid or address the aforementioned drawbacks of the pro-
duction function estimation approach. Specically, the empirical specication in our
1See Young (2003) for a thorough survey of the literature on the Chinese data. Because of his excellent
reference to it, we shall omit detailed discussion of the literature.
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approach naturally involves dynamic panel data, which allows us to use the system GMM
(Generalized method of moments) estimation (see Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell
and Bond, 1998; Roodman, 2006) to overcome the potential endogeneity of important
explanatory variables of output growth. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and
Bond (1998) show that system GMM estimator can dramatically improve e¢ ciency and
avoid the weak instruments problem in the rst-di¤erence GMM estimator. At the macro
level, almost all explanatory variables of output growth may be endogenous to the growth
process. For instance, human capital accumulation, technological progress, and all kinds
of policies are all possibly endogenous due to the feedback e¤ect from growth. The afore-
mentioned debates are all partly related to the direction of causality between growth and
its determinants. Therefore, our regression approach allows us to establish a causal rela-
tionship between growth and its determinants. Moreover, it can isolate the contributions
of human capital and technological change to output growth.
We combine the technological di¤usion model based on Acemoglu (2009, ch. 18)
with the augmented Solow model from Mankiw et al. (1992) to describe the reform and
opening-up period Chinese economy. The production function depends on technology,
physical capital, human capital and raw labor. The technological progress of the reform
and opening-up period Chinese economy depends on the absorption of world frontier tech-
nologies and its own domestic technological innovations. Following previous studies (see
e.g., Findlay, 1978; Borensztein et al., 1998; Keller and Yeaple, 2003), foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) is assumed to be the main channel for advanced technologies to be transferred
to the backward Chinese economy. Solving the model and then approximating around the
steady state, we derive an empirical formulation similar to the augmented Solow model
(see Mankiw et al., 1992), with two additional independent variables capturing Chinas
absorption of world frontier technologies and its domestic innovations.
Then we build the necessary macroeconomic series by choosing the most consistent
data provided by the Statistical Yearbook of China (hereafter SYC). Specically, we
choose the period 1978-2002 to avoid the statistical adjustment on GDP (Gross Domestic
Product) in 2005 detailed later by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (hereafter
NBSC) (see Holz, 2008). We take ve-year averages of the data to avoid the inuence
from business cycle uctuations, which matches the political cycle in China. We use the
nominal GDP and GDP indexes from SYC to calculate the provincial real GDP. We use
the labor force data from SYC rather than the provincial statistical yearbooks to avoid
the large upward adjustment in labor force in 1990 by some provinces (detailed in Young,
2003, section IV). Then we calculate the growth rate of real GDP per worker and initial
real GDP per worker. Following Mankiw et al. (1992), we use both the primary and the
secondary school enrollment rates to measure human capital investment rate. Following
Borensztein et al. (1998), we use the ratio of nominal FDI to nominal GDP to measure
technological di¤usion. To avoid the deatorsproblem on physical capital investment
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(see Young, section VI), we use nominal physical investment to nominal GDP to measure
physical capital investment rate.
The reform period Chinese data provide a balanced panel data of 27 provinces and 5
time periods, which allows us to control for xed time and province e¤ects. We test the
data against the predictions of the model. Both LSDV (Least squares dummy variables)
and system GMM estimations yield similar results. The estimated coe¢ cient on initial
real GDP per worker is negative and signicant at the 1% level, showing strong evidence
of conditional convergence. The estimated coe¢ cients on secondary school human capital
investment rates and labor force growth are positive and negative respectively, signicant
at least at the 5% level. The test accepts that the estimate coe¢ cients on physical capital
and secondary school human capital investment rates are equal, with absolute magnitudes
about half of that on labor force growth in LSDV estimation. In LSDV estimations, the
estimated coe¢ cient on physical capital investment rate is signicant without the FDI to
GDP ratio in the regression and insignicant with FDI/GDP in the regression, while it is
always insignicant in system GMM estimation. The estimated coe¢ cient on the FDI to
GDP ratio is insignicant in LSDV estimation but becomes signicant in system GMM
estimation. Therefore, except for physical capital investment, the Chinese macro panel
data t the model well.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we derive the empirical formulation and
construct the variables. Section 3 presents the estimation results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Data
2.1 Deriving the Empirical Specication
China has undertaken the market-oriented reform and opening-up in 1978. That is, China
has not only made continuous e¤orts to reform its economic institutions, but also opened
its borders to foreign investors and trade.2 Therefore, the Chinese provinces can be treated
as backward small open economies that rely on the absorption of technological expertises
from abroad to achieve technological progress. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, p. 350),
for instance, have stated that the absorption of technological expertises from Hong Kong
has been important for Chinas technological progress. Therefore, we use the technology
di¤usion and absorption model based on Acemoglu (2009, ch. 18) to derive the empirical
formulation. Following previous works (e.g., Findlay, 1978; Keller and Yeaple, 2003),
FDI is assumed to be the main channel for advanced technology to be transferred to the
backward Chinese economy.
2Technological imitation from leading countries is emphasized by Deng (1975), the designer of the
reform and opening-up and the leader of China after 1978.
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For a Chinese province i in year t, its aggregate production function for a unique nal
good is
Yit = K

itH

it (AitLit)
1   , (1)
where K, H, and L are physical capital, human capital, and raw labor respectively. Ait
is its level of technology, and git =

Ait
Ait
is the growth rate of technology. The output per
e¤ective labor is yit = kith

it, where the e¤ective capital-labor ratio, kit, and the e¤ective
human capital-labor ratio, hit, evolve according to

kit = skyit   (n+ git + ) kit (2)

hit = shyit   (n+ git + )hit, (3)
where sk, sh are exogenous physical and human capital investment rates respectively. n
and  are exogenous population growth rate and depreciation rate respectively.
The world technological frontier Awt is assumed to grow at an exogenous rate g
w.
However, not all world frontier technologies are available for imitating. We assume that,
at any time, the available pool of technology for imitating depends on how many foreign
rms conduct direct investment in the backward economy, which is measured as inward
FDI to GDP ratio (denoted as FDIit). Therefore, following Acemoglu, we posit the
following law of motion for technology:

Ait = it  (Awt  FDIit   Ait) + iAit; (4)
where the rst term on the right-hand-side (RHS) of equation (4) measures the absorp-
tion/imitation of world technology and the second term, , measures domestic innova-
tions. Technology absorption depends on the product of the absorptive capability ()
and the technology gap between world technology frontier available for absorption and
the domestic level of technology, (FDIit  Awt   Ait).
As in Acemoglu, we dene the inverse of the distance to the world frontier, ait < 1, as
ait =
Ait
Awt
. Using equation (4), we have

ait = it  FDIit   (it + gw   i) ait: (5)
We begin with the steady state. In the steady state, the technological progress rate
of the small economy, g, is equal to gw. And in steady state,

kit = 0 and

hit = 0. Then
steady state output per e¤ective labor can be solve as
yi = (sk)

1   (sh)

1   (n+ gw + ) 
+
1   . (6)
Approximating around the steady state, the speed of convergence is  = (1    ) (n+ gw + ).
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Following the steps in Mankiw et al. (1992, p. 423), we end up with
ln (yit)  ln (yit 1) =  
 
1  e  ln (yit 1) +  1  e  ln (yi ) , (7)
where ln (yi ) can be expressed as exogenous parameters as in equations (6). Since the
above equation is output per e¤ective labor, we transform it into output per labor. Output
per labor is Y
L
, which is equal to yA. Hence we have
ln

Y
L

it
  ln

Y
L

it 1
= [ln (yit)  ln (yit 1)] + [ln (Ait)  ln (Ait 1)] . (8)
Combining equations (7) and (8) yields
ln

Y
L

it
  ln

Y
L

it 1
=    1  e  ln (yit 1) +  1  e  ln (yi ) + git. (9)
The technological growth rate of the small economy, git, is
git =

Ait
Ait
=

ait
ait
+ gw =
FDIit
ait
it   it + i: (10)
According to equation (10), higher inow of FDI will increase the technological growth
rate of the backward economy. Substituting out git using equation (10) and ln (yi ) using
equation (6) from equation (9), we have our nal empirical specication as
ln

Y
L

it
  ln

Y
L

it 1
=
FDIit
ait
it   it + i  
 
1  e  ln (yit 1)
+
 
1  e  
1     ln (sk)it +
 
1  e  
1     ln (sh)it
   1  e  + 
1     ln (nit + g
w + ) : (11)
The last four terms in equation (11) are exactly the same as those in the augmented
Solow model (see Mankiw et al., 1992). The rst two terms on the RHS of equation (11)
are new and capture the technological progress of the backward economy. Higher inow
of FDI would raise its growth rate. The domestic technological advances of the backward
economy () would also speed up the growth of the backward economy.
Specically, we use the following formulation for empirical assessment:
growthit = 0 ln(
FDI
GDP
)it   1 ln

GDP
L

i;t 1
+ 2 ln(
I
GDP
)it
+3 ln(School)it   4 ln(nit + gw + ) + ui + Tt + "it (12)
where growthit is the average annual growth of real GDP per worker for ith province at
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period t; As in Borensztein et al. (1998), FDI
GDP
is the ratio of nominal FDI to nominal
GDP, which measures technological di¤usion/absorption from abroad. ln
 
GDP
L

i;t 1 , real
GDP per worker at the beginning of period t, controls for conditional convergence. I
GDP
and School measure physical capital investment rate and human capital investment rate
respectively. (nit+gw+) measures labor force growth. ui and Tt stand for xed province
and time e¤ects respectively. The xed province e¤ects could capture the time-invariant
provincial technological advances.
According to equation (11), the coe¢ cients on physical and human capital investment
rates should be positive and equal, which are half of the absolute magnitude of the ex-
pected negative coe¢ cient on labor force growth. Moreover, the coe¢ cient on initial real
GDP per worker is negative and that on FDI
GDP
is positive.
2.2 Constructing the Variables
To test the reliability of the Chinese data, we want to use as many data as possible. And
we rely on the SYC for our data source. The reason is two-fold. First, many researchers
would turn to SYC for macro data on China when they need them. This is because SYC
is the most authoritative in providing the macro-data on China. Some (e.g., Chow, 1993;
Holz, 2003) argue that the Chinese data are intrinsically consistent. Second, if we nd
out that the Chinese data from SYC are not far from truth, one may still be able to use
them, provided that one deals with the statistical adjustments made by the NBSC.
2.2.1 The Data Sample
We try to include as many years as possible for the reform period. This is actually
consistent with our model that studies a backward open economy. China has become an
open economy in 1978. Moreover, we can avoid additional issues on the data of the pre-
reform period as argued by Young. We will follow the common practice in the empirical
growth literature to take ve-year average of the reform period data. This yields six time
periods, with the last one covering 2003-2007. However, the NBSC has made a signicant
statistical adjustment at the end of 2005 concerning GDP accounting (see Holz, 2008).
Resultantly, the Chinese GDP has been revised upward around 16.8% due to the large
adjustment in the service sector. Therefore, the data on GDP after year 2004 di¤er a lot
from previous years. Although NBSC has provided a revised series of GDP data back to
1993, we use the old series simply for consistency. Therefore, we only include ve time
periods covering 1978-2002. The ve-year averaging of the data matches exactly with the
political cycle in China. The National Peoples Congress (NPC) and the Chinese Peoples
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) are held in the same year every ve years
starting from 1978, setting up all the important economic policies in China.
Before 1998, among the 31 provincial governments in China, four are municipalities
and four are autonomous regions. We delegate the usage provinceto all. Before 1997,
6
Chongqing was a city of Sichuan province, hence both of them are excluded from the
sample. Hainan was part of Guangdong before it became an independent province. Since
there is a complete set of data for Guangdong, it is kept in the data sample while Hainan
is dropped. Tibet is excluded because there are many missing data. In summary, the data
sample comprises panel data of 27 provinces and 25 years (1978-2002), which produces a
balanced panel with 135 observations.
2.2.2 Data on FDI
The provincial FDI inow data and the nominal GDP data are available from SYC. The
FDI data are in US dollars, we multiply them by the xed exchange rate of the Chinese
currency (yuan) against the US dollar in each year to get the FDI data in Chinese currency.
China has adopted the xed exchange rate regime until year 2005 in which the government
allows its currency to appreciate gradually each year. We then calculate the ratios of FDI
over nominal GDP in each year as our measure of FDI, denoted by FDI/GDP. Although
China opened its borders to foreign investors in 1978, many Chinese provinces did not
receive FDI until the early 1980s. Only three Chinese provinces (Liaoning, Fujian and
Guangdong) received any FDI during the period 1978-82. The datum for Liaoning for
1978-82 is zero in the Appendix because it is too small. The FDI data for eary years are
from the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University.
2.2.3 Data on Real GDP
The SYC only provides nominal GDP and GDP indexes for each province. The provincial
GDP data for early years are also from the China Center for Economic Research at
Peking University. The problem with the implicit GDP deator has been analyzed by
Young (2003). Young decomposes the Chinese output into sectors and uses available
price indices. He nds out that this would lower the aggregate GDP growth by 1.7%.
Although we do not make systematic adjustments, we argue that this problem may apply
to all Chinese provinces. In our cross province comparisons, this problem can be treated
as measurement error on the dependent variable. With the nominal GDP and the GDP
indexes and 1978 as our base year, the real GDP can be calculated as follows. We multiply
the nominal GDP in 1978 by the GDP index in that year then divide the result by 100.
The GDP deator, which is not needed in our analysis, can then be backed out.
2.2.4 Data on Labor Force
To calculate our dependent variable, we need data on the labor force. However, there is
a large statistical adjustment in 1990 on labor force. This has been analyzed in Young
(1233-1234). For instance, the provincial statistical bureau of Jiangsu reported its labor
force by using a new measurement detailed in Young. Resultantly, its labor force jumps
from 35.19 million in 1989 to 42.25 million in 1990, while the SYC lists its labor force at
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35.69 million in 1990. The provincial statistical bureau reports 6.56 million more workers.
The provincial statistical bureau of Jiangsu should revise its labor force data before 1989
accordingly, but it did not. The same happened to Hubei province. It revised, using
the new accounting method, its labor force from 24.33 million in 1989 to 30.40 million
in 1990, while the SYC lists its labor force at 24.79 million in 1990. Around half of
Chinese provinces made the changed in 1990. One can infer that it is not the case that
the provincial statistical bureau has made up the numbers. Instead, it is just the change
in statistical caliber as detailed in Young. Fortunately, SYC has maintained the original
statistical caliber and provided the data on provincial labor force.3 Therefore, this relative
more consistent series provided by SYC allow us to cover the periods before and after 1990
to avoid spurious labor force growth(Young, p. 1234).
Now with the labor force data and the real GDP data, we can calculate two needed
variables: the growth rate of real GDP per worker (our dependent variable), and the labor
force growth rate. Labor force growth, (n + gw + ), is measured as labor force growth
rate (n) plus 0.08 that is assumed for (gw + ). That is, we assume a 2% world annual
growth and a 6% depreciation rate for China. As in Mankiw et al. (1992), our result is
insensitive to the assumed number for (gw + ). The labor force data are also used to
measure the human capital investment rate.
2.2.5 Data on Human Capital
Based on the convergence formulation, human capital investment rate is an important
determinant of growth, which has been overlooked in the studies on China in Weeks and
Yao (2003). Mankiw et al. (1992) use the secondary school enrollment rate the ratio
of the secondary school enrollment to the working age population to measure human
capital investment rate. They pointed out that they ignore education at the primary
and higher levels. The SYC provides complete data on the student enrollments for all
levels of education in China: the primary, the secondary and the higher education levels.
Since China is a backward country, we, following Mankiw et al., have two measures of
human capital investment rate: SCHOOL01 is the ratio of primary school enrollment
to the labor force; SCHOOL02 is the ratio of secondary school enrollment (grade 7 to
12) to labor force. There are studies that group all levels of education together with a
quality measure (e.g., years of schooling and student performance) as weight (see e.g.,
Wößmann, 2002). We do not follow this approach because the quality of education has
its own measurement problem detailed in Young (section V). The student enrollment in
China may be one of the most accurately documented series in SYC.
3For the majority of the years and provinces, the labor force data provided by SYC seem reasonable.
However, we also nd out some rare anomaly in it. For instance, the labor force datum for Beijing
jumps to 7.99 million in 2002 from 6.29 million in 2001, while the provincial statistical yearbook lists the
numbers in 2002 and 2001 as 6.79 and 6.29 million respectively.
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2.2.6 Data on Physical Capital
Chinas physical capital investment generates the largest controversy in previous liter-
ature (see Chow, 1993; Hsueh and Li, 1999; Young, section VI; Perkins and Rawski,
2008). According to Young, the deator of physical capital investment (the gross capital
formation in SYC) has been downwardly reported by the Chinese provincial statistical
bureaus. Therefore, if one uses the gross capital formation and its indexes to calculate
real investment, some provinces would have unbelievably high real investment rates. For
instance, the rates in some years of Tianjin and Gansu are over 100%. Without system-
atic adjustment, we resort to use the nominal invest rate, which is the ratio of nominal
physical capital investment to the nominal GDP. This would avoid the deatorsproblem
and the over 100% invest rates. The average nominal investment rate for all the provinces
in our data sample is 39% comparing to 41% for the average real investment rates. Table
1 lists the summary statistics of our data. The detailed data are listed in the Appendix.
[Table 1 Here]
3 Estimation Results
3.1 Regressions Based on Augmented Solow Model
In this paper, to fully test the reliability of the Chinese macro panel data, we rst report
the results by dropping the FDI/GDP from our empirical formulation (11). In so doing,
it becomes the empirical formulation derived from the standard augmented Solow model
(see Mankiw et al., 1992). It has been widely used in cross-country growth regressions.
Therefore, it is meaningful to see how well the Chinese model ts it.
3.1.1 LSDV Regressions
We rst use LSDV estimation. That is, we use OLS (Ordinary least squares) estimation
that includes 27 province dummies and 5 time dummies. Table 2 summarizes the results.
Column 2.1 in Table 2 reports the LSDV results with secondary school enrollment
rate, ln(SCHOOL02), as the measure of human capital investment rate. One can see that
the estimated coe¢ cient on initial real output per worker is negative and signicant at
the 1% level, showing strong evidence of conditional convergence. This is consistent with
previous studies such as Weeks and Yao (2003). That is, after controlling for other factors,
richer provinces tend to grow slower, consistent with augmented Solow model. The speed
of convergence is 5.8% per year, similar to the 4-6% per year predicted by the augmented
Solow model but larger than the 2% per year in empirical studies (see Weeks and Yao,
2003). The estimated coe¢ cient on ln
 
I
GDP

is positive and signicant at the 5% level.
That is, a higher domestic physical capital investment rate is associated with a higher rate
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of ecoomic growth, consistent with augmented Solow model. The estimated coe¢ cient on
ln(SCHOOL02) is positive and signicant at the 5% level, while that on ln (n+ gw + ) is
negative and signicant at the 1% level. In other words, a higher secondary school human
capital investment rate is associated with a higher rate of ecoomic growth, consistent with
augmented Solow model. A higher rate of labor force growth is associated with a lower
rate of economic growth, consistent with augmented Solow model.
According to the prediction of the theory, we test whether the estimated coe¢ cients on
ln
 
I
GDP

and ln(SCHOOL02) are equal. The F-test yields a p-value of 0.81, meaning we
accept the null that the coe¢ cients on ln
 
I
GDP

and ln(SCHOOL02) are equal. Similarly,
we test whether the estimated coe¢ cient on ln
 
I
GDP

is half of the absolute magnitude
of that on ln (n+ gw + ). The F-test yields a p-value of 0.28, supporting the theoretical
prediction. According to the F-test, we also accept the null hypothesis that the estimated
coe¢ cient on ln(SCHOOL02) is half of the absolute magnitude of that on ln (n+ gw + ).
The adjusted R-squared is 0.81, meaning our regression explains more than 80% of the
variation in the growth of real GDP per worker. Taken together, the often-suspected
Chinese aggregate data t the model quite well.
Column 2.2 in Table 2 reports the LSDV results with primary school enrollment rate,
ln(SCHOOL01), as the measure of human capital investment rate. One can see that the
estimated coe¢ cient on ln(SCHOOL01) is negative and insignicant, while those on the
other variables are still signicant at the 5% level with quite similar magnitudes to those in
column 2.1. Column 2.3 in Table 2 reports the LSDV results with both ln(SCHOOL01)
and ln(SCHOOL02) in the regression. One can observe that the results on the main
variables are also very similar to those in column 2.1.
From the LSDV results in Table 2, one can observe that the results on initial real
GDP per worker, physical capital investment rate, and labor force growth are very stable.
Using secondary school enrollment rate instead of the primary school enrollment rate to
measure human capital investment rate improves the model t.
[Table 2 Here]
3.1.2 System GMM Estimation
Our model has the characteristics listed in Roodman (2006), namely, small T, large
N; a linear functional relationship with a single left-hand-side variable that is dynamic,
depending on its own past realizations; independent variables that are not strictly exoge-
nous; xed individual e¤ects; heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals,
but not across them.The dynamic structure of the model makes the LSDV estimators
biased and inconsistent. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show
that system GMM estimator can dramatically improve e¢ ciency and avoid the weak in-
struments problem in the rst-di¤erence GMM estimator. Therefore, we re-estimate our
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model with system GMM estimator. In using the system GMM, we treat initial real GDP
per worker as predetermined, and all the other main independent variables as endogenous.
Following Roodman (2006), the province dummies are excluded, while the time dummies
are used as exogenous instruments to make sure that the number of instruments is smaller
than the number of groups (i.e., 27).4 The results are reported in Table 3.
Column 3.1 in Table 3 reports the system GMM estimation results with secondary
school enrollment rate as the measure of human capital investment rate. Both the Sargan
and the Hansen tests for over-identifying restrictions conrm that the instrument set can
be considered valid. The F-test shows that the overall regression is signicant. The
Arellano-Bond test accepts the hypothesis of no autocorrelation of the second order,
supporting the model specication. Comparing with the LSDV estimation results in
Table 2, one can see that the estimated coe¢ cient on initial real GDP per worker remains
negative and signicant at the 1% level, with a larger magnitude. The estimated coe¢ cient
on ln
 
I
GDP

becomes negative and insignicant at the 10% level. The estimated coe¢ cient
on ln (n+ gw + ) remains negative but becomes signicant at the 5% level, with a similar
magnitude. The estimated coe¢ cient on ln(SCHOOL02) remains positive but becomes
signicant at the 1% level, with a much larger magnitude.
Column 3.2 in Table 3 reports the system GMM results with primary school enrollment
rate as the measure of human capital investment rate. One can see that the estimated
coe¢ cient on ln(SCHOOL01) is negative and insignicant, while those on the other vari-
ables are still signicant at the 5% level. Moreover, the Hansen test shows that the
instruments are invalid. This may be due to omitting other important variables such as
the secondary school enrollment rate. Column 3.3 in Table 3 presents the results with
both ln(SCHOOL01) and ln(SCHOOL02) in the regression. One can observe that the
results on the main variables are also very similar to those in column 3.1.
Comparing the LSDV and system GMM estimation results, one can observe that the
estimated coe¢ cient on initial real GDP per worker is always negative and signicant
at the 5% level, showing strong evidence of conditional convergence. The estimated co-
e¢ cient on labor force growth is always negative and signicant at the 5% level. The
estimated coe¢ cient on human capital investment rate measured by secondary school en-
rollment rate is always positive and signicant at the 5% level. All these are consistent
with the augmented Solow model. The estimated coe¢ cient on physical capital invest-
ment rate, however, is signicant in LSDV estimation but insignicant in system GMM
estimation. Nevertheless, even with real physical capital investment rate, Weeks and Yao
(2003) still show that its estimated coe¢ cient is insignicant in system GMM estimation.
[Table 3 Here]
4Our command in STATA10 is "xtabond2 growth lninigdp lninvest lnlabor lnschool2 t1-t5,
gmm(L.(growth lninvest lnlabor lnschool2) lninigdp, lag(2 2) eq(di¤)) iv(t1-t5) robust small", where
t1-t5 are time dummies.
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3.2 Regressions Based on Technological Di¤usion Model
Now we report the results by including FDI/GDP in our empirical formulation. That
is, we are using equation (12). It is derived from a combination of the technological
absorption model and the augmented Solow model. However, as discussed, because of the
lack of FDI to the Chinese provinces for the period 1978-82, we now have 110 observations.
Moreover, given the results in the previous section, we use the secondary school enrollment
rate to measure human capital investment rate.
3.2.1 LSDV Regressions
The LSDV estimation results are presented in column 2.4 in Table 2. One can observe
that the estimated coe¢ cients on initial real GDP per worker and ln (n+ gw + ) remain
negative and signicant at the 1% level, with magnitudes similar to those in LSDV esti-
mation. The estimated coe¢ cient on ln
 
I
GDP

remains positive but becomes insignicant
at the 10% level, with a similar magnitude. The estimated coe¢ cient on ln(SCHOOL02)
remains positive and signicant at the 5% level, with a much larger magnitude. There-
fore, the results are robust when we further include FDI/GDP to control for technological
absorption. However, although the estimated coe¢ cient on ln
 
FDI
GDP

is positive, it is in-
signicant at the 10% level. This is consistent with previous studies (see e.g., Borensztein
et al., 1998, and their discussion and explanation on this issue).
3.2.2 System GMM Estimation
The systemGMM estimation results with ln
 
FDI
GDP

as an additional regressor are presented
in column 3.4 in Table 3. Both the Sargan and the Hansen tests for over-identifying re-
strictions conrm that the instruments are valid. Moreover, the p-values of both Sargan
and Hansen over-identication tests become much larger comparing to column 3.1. Al-
though it is well-known that over-identication tests have very little statistical power, the
much larger p-values of these tests show that there is little evidence of omitted variable
bias. That is, by further including ln
 
FDI
GDP

in the regression, our model specication is
more suitable for the reform period Chinese economy. The F-test shows that the overall
regression is signicant. The Arellano-Bond test rejects the hypothesis of no autocorrela-
tion of the rst order at the 5% level, and accepts the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation
of the second order. All these support our model specication.
One can observe that the results on other variables are pretty similar to those in
column 3.1 without ln
 
FDI
GDP

in the regression. The estimated coe¢ cient on ln
 
FDI
GDP

remains positive, which becomes signicant at the 1% level. That is, after overcoming its
potential endogeneity problem, FDI is conducive to the economic growth in China. This
conrms the technological di¤usion model in section 2.1.
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4 Conclusions
The importance to study the Chinese economy goes without emphasizing. The statistical
data are vital for any serious research on the Chinese economy. In this paper we focus
the macro-data provided by SYC. As Young argues: The data of most economies are
lled with apparently inconsistent series...Consequently, the only value added in a paper
of this sort lies in its treatment and exposition of the data.We build necessary variables
by choosing the consistent series and using alternative measures to avoid the detected
inconsistency. We end up with a Chinese macro panel data on 27 provinces for the reform
and opening-up period 1978-2002.
Using a technological di¤usion/absorption model to describe the Chinese economy
during our sample period, we derive the empirical specication. It is similar to the aug-
mented Solow model with one additional independent variable capturing the technological
absorption from abroad. We then use the Chinese macro panel data to test how well they
t the model. We nd that the results on conditional convergence (measured by initial
real GDP per worker), human capital investment rate (proxied by secondary school en-
rollment rate), and labor force growth conrm the theoretical predictions. The results are
robust to the inclusion/exclusion of technological progress from absorbing world frontier
technologies. Moreover, both LSDV estimation and system GMM estimation that over-
comes the potential endogeneity of growth determinants yield these results, despite that
the estimated magnitudes are somewhat di¤erent between the two estimation methods.
Last but not least, the estimated coe¢ cient on the FDI to GDP ratio is signicant in
system GMM estimation, meaning the technological di¤usion model is more suitable to
describe the reform period Chinese economy.
Therefore, except for physical capital investment, the Chinese data may be reliable for
growth regressions. The results are not surprising as Holz (2003) nds: What is left is
problems in understanding the meaning and coverage of various Chinese statistics,..., but
no evidence of data falsication at the national level.He examines the recent criticism
of statistics on Chinas GDP and shows that the criticism is unfounded as it is based on
misunderstanding. Nevertheless, the problem with physical capital (extensively discussed
in Chow, 1993, and Young, 2003, section VI) may pose serious problem for business cycle
studies on China that rely on the volatile uctuations in investment to explain business
uctuations (see e.g., King, Plosser and Rebelo, 1988). We leave this to future research.
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Appendix
Annual initial real
Province Growth GDP per worker School02 n+gw+ I/GDP FDI/GDP
Beijing78-82 1.48 2451 15.7 12.8 28.4 0
Beijing83-87 7.24 2952 9.1 10.3 51.9 0.60
Beijing88-92 3.12 4900 7.2 10.3 60.2 3.56
Beijing93-97 8.41 6515 9.1 7.8 76.4 7.77
Beijing98-02 3.20 11529 10.3 12.4 65.2 6.33
Tianjin78-82 2.93 2254 14.4 11.5 31.2 0
Tianjin83-87 6.52 2731 8.1 10.3 42.3 0.78
Tianjin88-92 3.59 4060 7.6 8.1 49.9 1.24
Tianjin93-97 9.85 5380 9.2 8.8 57.4 13.20
Tianjin98-02 9.73 11076 13.7 4.2 51.3 9.00
Hebei78-82 2.13 868 14.6 10.7 30.1 0
Hebei83-87 6.42 1015 9.4 11.1 35.4 0.03
Hebei88-92 4.82 1541 7.4 11.1 36.2 0.28
Hebei93-97 9.22 2264 9.4 9.4 43.0 1.95
Hebei98-02 7.04 4013 14.0 7.8 46.2 1.56
Shanxi78-82 3.41 912 17.2 10.4 31.4 0
Shanxi83-87 5.07 1211 13.5 10.9 44.9 0.01
Shanxi88-92 3.20 1637 11.3 10.8 42.5 0.19
Shanxi93-97 7.03 2138 10.5 9.1 41.1 0.83
Shanxi98-02 6.49 3419 14.2 7.1 46.6 1.30
Inner Mongolia78-82 4.51 889 19.3 12.0 30.5 0
Inner Mongolia83-87 6.80 1168 13.1 11.2 34.4 0.01
Inner Mongolia88-92 4.03 1769 11.5 9.9 40.8 0.07
Inner Mongolia93-97 7.01 2347 10.5 9.4 47.2 0.69
Inner Mongolia98-02 7.39 3810 13.0 7.2 43.9 0.62
Liaoning78-82 -1.09 1828 19.5 13.8 22.8 0
Liaoning83-87 7.57 1881 10.9 11.2 31.6 0.14
Liaoning88-92 3.26 3029 9.9 9.3 37.3 1.17
Liaoning93-97 5.74 4100 9.7 9.1 38.0 4.80
Liaoning98-02 6.69 6715 11.8 5.9 32.2 3.98
Jilin78-82 -0.56 1270 25.4 15.2 30.6 0
Jilin83-87 4.58 1507 14.9 12.0 35.0 0.01
Jilin88-92 1.59 2050 10.7 11.5 39.4 0.26
Jilin93-97 8.73 2492 10.3 8.2 40.8 2.57
Jilin98-02 7.49 4614 13.0 5.7 38.9 1.49
Heilongjiang78-82 2.17 1736 21.9 11.0 25.1 0
Heilongjiang83-87 3.44 1989 16.1 11.3 37.5 0.06
Heilongjiang88-92 3.21 2518 12.9 10.1 36.6 0.26
Heilongjiang93-97 5.11 3143 11.5 10.4 35.6 1.88
Heilongjiang98-02 7.91 4228 14.6 7.6 33.7 0.95
Shanghai78-82 3.72 3907 9.6 10.3 20.9 0
Shanghai83-87 6.52 5041 6.3 8.6 35.5 0.60
Shanghai88-92 6.13 7652 6.3 7.4 45.3 2.15
Shanghai93-97 9.35 12335 9.1 8.2 59.3 11.81
Shanghai98-02 5.94 24914 11.4 7.5 47.8 6.67
14
Appendix (Continued)
Annual initial real
Province Growth GDP per worker School02 n+gw+ I/GDP FDI/GDP
Jiangsu78-82 5.65 897 11.5 9.9 30.4 0
Jiangsu83-87 8.31 1309 8.8 10.8 40.6 0.08
Jiangsu88-92 6.37 2321 7.9 9.7 43.7 1.30
Jiangsu93-97 10.48 3809 8.3 8.1 48.5 7.59
Jiangsu98-02 8.80 7357 10.7 6.7 45.6 6.86
Zhejiang78-82 7.50 689 9.3 11.0 25.9 0
Zhejiang83-87 9.72 1023 7.5 11.9 33.1 0.09
Zhejiang88-92 6.46 1808 6.8 9.4 34.5 0.47
Zhejiang93-97 10.92 3009 7.7 8.6 47.9 3.35
Zhejiang98-02 7.01 5825 9.0 9.0 45.7 2.46
Anhui78-82 4.76 608 12.4 11.6 19.8 0
Anhui83-87 6.38 825 8.8 11.5 31.7 0.03
Anhui88-92 2.20 1149 7.9 11.1 31.9 0.13
Anhui93-97 9.81 1517 8.6 10.2 40.3 1.85
Anhui98-02 5.96 2697 10.7 8.5 37.0 0.83
Fujian78-82 6.99 718 10.7 10.7 30.3 0.01
Fujian83-87 7.04 1051 9.4 11.8 31.9 0.89
Fujian88-92 6.28 1651 8.0 11.8 31.2 4.66
Fujian93-97 10.79 2748 10.3 9.6 44.9 15.98
Fujian98-02 6.37 5210 14.0 9.2 46.4 8.30
Jiangxi78-82 3.97 694 11.4 11.4 33.4 0
Jiangxi83-87 6.36 865 10.0 11.1 33.1 0.04
Jiangxi88-92 4.69 1282 10.0 10.3 34.8 0.31
Jiangxi93-97 5.42 1880 9.8 10.1 39.2 2.11
Jiangxi98-02 6.82 2781 13.4 6.8 38.9 1.92
Shandong78-82 4.92 759 12.9 10.4 32.0 0
Shandong83-87 9.32 952 9.6 11.1 36.1 0.05
Shandong88-92 5.15 1655 9.1 11.2 43.5 0.92
Shandong93-97 9.08 2570 10.2 9.3 47.0 4.40
Shandong98-02 7.63 4534 13.9 8.2 48.0 2.93
Henan78-82 4.60 580 15.6 10.9 30.3 0
Henan83-87 5.36 865 10.2 11.8 36.4 0.02
Henan88-92 3.37 1199 8.7 11.0 41.1 0.24
Henan93-97 7.67 1609 8.9 10.7 41.0 1.37
Henan98-02 4.91 2575 11.7 10.0 42.1 0.85
Hubei78-82 5.70 790 15.8 10.5 24.7 0
Hubei83-87 7.70 1094 11.0 10.2 31.2 0.04
Hubei88-92 4.43 1694 8.8 9.8 31.8 0.40
Hubei93-97 9.62 2391 9.4 9.1 40.3 2.35
Hubei98-02 8.03 4418 14.0 6.2 44.2 2.10
Hunan78-82 3.45 645 12.0 10.7 22.9 0
Hunan83-87 5.16 819 9.1 10.7 25.5 0.06
Hunan88-92 3.16 1111 8.0 10.6 28.1 0.23
Hunan93-97 6.99 1442 8.2 9.6 34.9 2.19
Hunan98-02 6.94 2278 11.4 7.3 35.7 1.75
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Annual initial real
Province Growth GDP per worker School02 n+gw+ I/GDP FDI/GDP
Guangdong78-82 6.64 817 10.6 10.6 28.7 0.39
Guangdong83-87 9.69 1198 8.5 10.9 33.5 2.63
Guangdong88-92 8.30 2188 7.6 11.1 34.6 5.53
Guangdong93-97 8.63 3958 9.3 10.2 41.9 15.67
Guangdong98-02 6.72 6799 12.1 9.0 36.9 10.18
Guangxi78-82 3.79 521 10.3 11.5 29.7 0
Guangxi83-87 3.72 633 6.4 11.3 30.1 0.26
Guangxi88-92 5.87 777 6.7 10.5 29.6 0.76
Guangxi93-97 6.64 1200 8.3 10.0 38.5 4.97
Guangxi98-02 5.68 1811 11.0 8.9 34.1 2.30
Guizhou78-82 4.43 442 10.1 11.5 36.2 0
Guizhou83-87 5.25 608 6.9 11.5 32.3 0.02
Guizhou88-92 1.83 834 6.0 11.9 32.4 0.17
Guizhou93-97 4.79 989 5.9 10.0 35.7 0.70
Guizhou98-02 5.35 1349 8.1 9.6 50.2 0.30
Yunnan78-82 3.41 526 7.2 12.1 35.5 0
Yunnan83-87 6.00 659 6.1 10.9 32.5 0.04
Yunnan88-92 3.68 1004 6.4 11.0 33.8 0.09
Yunnan93-97 6.79 1309 6.0 9.7 43.4 0.69
Yunnan98-02 4.98 1966 8.0 8.8 40.9 0.51
Shaanxi78-82 2.52 752 15.2 11.8 34.5 0
Shaanxi83-87 7.49 890 12.3 11.0 42.7 0.39
Shaanxi88-92 1.96 1519 8.9 11.2 43.2 0.91
Shaanxi93-97 5.74 1857 8.3 9.3 47.0 2.87
Shaanxi98-02 6.16 2714 12.7 8.7 49.8 1.52
Gansu78-82 -2.56 933 12.1 13.9 37.9 0
Gansu83-87 6.24 820 9.2 13.6 37.7 0
Gansu88-92 3.85 1224 7.9 10.8 41.6 0.02
Gansu93-97 6.15 1526 6.3 11.3 40.2 0.88
Gansu98-02 5.91 2252 8.5 9.1 43.8 0.45
Qinghai78-82 -0.04 1074 12.8 12.3 54.6 0
Qinghai83-87 5.17 1164 12.3 10.5 54.1 0
Qinghai88-92 1.55 1589 10.7 10.2 45.0 0.01
Qinghai93-97 4.86 1874 8.6 9.7 48.7 0.12
Qinghai98-02 6.49 2661 9.5 9.0 63.9 0.49
Ningxia78-82 2.13 959 15.1 11.5 54.0 0
Ningxia83-87 5.75 1178 13.5 12.2 58.1 0
Ningxia88-92 2.23 1702 13.4 11.3 57.8 0.11
Ningxia93-97 4.28 2045 9.1 11.0 51.8 0.42
Ningxia98-02 5.77 2757 9.5 9.6 64.4 0.80
Xinjiang78-82 5.50 794 16.0 10.1 45.0 0
Xinjiang83-87 8.37 1161 17.0 9.8 47.3 0.16
Xinjiang88-92 7.15 1906 14.1 9.7 53.8 0.12
Xinjiang93-97 5.77 2958 11.6 9.7 63.5 0.56
Xinjiang98-02 5.40 4311 16.8 8.3 52.1 0.13
Note: Except for initial real GDP, all variables are ve-year averages and in percent per year.
School02 is the percentage of labor force in secondary school.
I/GDP and FDI/GDP are nominal investment and FDI to nominal GDP ratios respectively.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
growth (annual, %) 5.65 2.45  2.56 10.92
ln(GDP/L)t 1 7.50 0.75 6.09 10.12
ln(School01) 3.19 0.31 2.39 3.87
ln(School02) 2.34 0.29 1.77 3.23
ln(FDI/GDP)  0.67 2.06  6.49 2.77
ln(I/GDP) 3.66 0.24 2.99 4.34
ln(n+ gw+) 2.30 0.18 1.44 2.72
Observations: 135 (110 for ln(FDI/GDP)). The data are ve-year averages for 27 provinces.
Except for growth, and ln(GDP
L
)t 1, all other variables are
multiplied by 100 and then taken logarithms.
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Table 2. LSDV Regressions Results. Dep. Var.: Average Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP
per worker 1978-82, 1983-87, 1988-92, 1993-97, 1998-2002.
Regression number
Independent Variable 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
ln
 
GDP
L

i;t 1
 5.02
(0.82)
 4.08
(0.77)
 4.87
(0.83)
 5.77
(1.01)
ln
 
I
GDP
 2.11
(0.90)
2.11
(0.93)
2.29
(0.92)
1.98
(1.33)
ln (n+ gw + )
 6.52
(0.94)
 6.44
(0.96)
 6.61
(0.94)
 5.89
(1.01)
ln (School02)
1.81
(0.90)
2.06
(0.93)
2.96
(1.11)
ln (School01)
 0.54
(0.98)
 1.08
(1.00)
ln
 
FDI
GDP
 0.19
(0.18)
Time Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
test ln I
GDP
=ln(School)
(p-value)
F(1,100)=0.06
(0.81)
F(1,100)=3.3
(0.07)
F(1,99)=0.04
(0.85)
F(1,74)=0.25
(0.62)
test 2ln I
GDP
+ln(n+gw+)=0
(p-value)
F(1,100)=1.18
(0.28)
F(1,100)=1.04
(0.31)
F(1,99)=0.90
(0.35)
F(1,74)=0.47
(0.50)
test 2ln(School)+ln(n+gw+)=0
(p-value)
F(1,100)=2.14
(0.15)
F(1,100)=11.2
(0.001)
F(1,99)=1.53
(0.22)
F(1,74)=0.00
(0.99)
R2 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.86
R2(adjusted) 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.79
Observations 135 135 135 110
***Signicant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, * at the 0.10 level
(standard errors in parentheses)
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Table 3. System GMM Regressions Results. Dep. Var.: Average Annual Growth Rate
of Real GDP per worker 1978-82, 1983-87, 1988-92, 1993-97, 1998-2002.
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM
Regression number
Independent Variable 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4
ln
 
GDP
L

i;t 1
 8.37
(2.18)
 3.49
(1.34)
 8.20
(2.42)
 7.65
(2.09)
ln
 
I
GDP
  0.17
(2.24)
3.90
(1.89)
 0.02
(2.65)
 1.73
(2.25)
ln (n+ gw + )
 5.89
(2.45)
 6.86
(2.42)
 6.15
(2.40)
 6.14
(2.28)
ln (School02)
5.92
(2.38)
5.59
(2.47)
8.36
(2.61)
ln (School01)
 1.25
(3.17)
0.18
(2.44)
ln
 
FDI
GDP
 1.48
(0.34)
Time Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sargan overID test p-value 0.188 0.113 0.251 0.789
Hansen overID test p-value 0.181 0.061 0.218 0.406
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) Pr>z = 0.137 Pr>z = 0.007 Pr>z = 0.114 Pr>z = 0.034
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) Pr>z = 0.932 Pr>z = 0.298 Pr>z = 0.895 Pr>z = 0.369
number of instruments 16 16 18 18
E¤ective observations 135 135 135 110
F-test 33.20 24.12 28.39 31.23
Note: ln
 
GDP
L

i;t 1 is treated as predetermined. All other independent variables except
the time dummies are treated as endogenous. Time dummies are used as instruments.
***Signicant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, * at the 0.10 level
(standard errors in parentheses)
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